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Abstract 19 
Sustainable development requires harnessing technological innovation to improve human well-being 20 in current and future generations. However, impoverished, marginalized, and unborn populations too 21 often lack the economic and political power to shape innovation systems to meet their needs. Issues 22 arise at all stages of innovation, from invention of a technology through its selection, production, 23 adaptation, adoption, and retirement. We argue that three insights should inform efforts to intervene in 24 innovation systems for sustainable development. First, innovation processes do not evolve linearly, 25 but rather emerge from complex adaptive systems involving many actors and institutions operating 26 simultaneously from local to global levels. Second, there has been significant experimentation in 27 mobilizing technology for sustainable development in the health, energy, and agriculture sectors, 28 among others, but learning from past experience requires structured cross-sectoral comparisons and 29 recognition of the socio-technical nature of innovation systems. Third, the current constellation of 30 rules, norms, and incentives shaping technological innovation is often not aligned towards sustainable 31 development. Past experience demonstrates that it is possible to reform these institutions to re-orient 32 innovation, and many actors have the power to do so through research, advocacy, training, convening, 33 policymaking, and financing. We offer three proposals to begin: establishing channels for regularized 34 learning across domains of practice, developing measures that systematically take into account the 35 interests of underserved populations throughout the innovation process, and reforming institutions to 36 re-orient innovation systems towards sustainable development in a manner that considers all 37 innovation stages and decision-making levels at the outset. 38 
Keywords: sustainable development, technology, innovation systems, complex adaptive systems, 39 knowledge systems 40 
Significance Statement 41 
The 2015 Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Agreement on climate change heightened global 42 attention on sustainable development. Transitioning toward sustainable development will require 43 technological innovation in many areas, such as clean energy and water-saving agriculture. However, 44 unless the rules and incentives shaping innovation systems change, this transition will be impossible. 45 Barriers to overcome include inadequate investment in technologies that could help people living in 46 poverty, a lack of affordable and suitable technologies to address a wide range of sustainable 47 development goals, and overuse of technologies that place unfair burdens on future generations. In 48 this paper, we identify the fundamental reasons why current innovation systems fall short, describe 49 what needs to change, and offer several proposals to begin making such change.  50 
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\body 51 
Technological innovation is at the heart of sustainable development. In September 2015, following an 52 extensive multi-year negotiation among governments, 193 countries of the United Nations committed 53 to 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Innovation itself is one of the SDGs (Goal 9) and also 54 a means to achieve the others. 55 
Technology is the subset of knowledge that includes the full range of devices, methods, processes, 56 and practices that can be used “to fulfill certain human purposes in a specifiable and reproducible way 57 (1). Innovation is the "process by which technology is conceived, developed, codified, and deployed” 58 (1). The innovation process occurs in multi-faceted “innovation systems” comprised of socially 59 negotiated goals, the technologies needed to reach these goals, people and organizations, and the rules 60 
and incentives that shape their decisions (2, 3). Many studies of innovation have focused on specific 61 nations (3), sectors (4), or technologies (5). However, learning across these approaches and 62 experiences is less common. 63 
Sustainable development requires simultaneously advancing inter- and intra-generational equity. 64 However, innovation does not always advance equity. For example, global investment in research and 65 development (R&D) in medicines for “neglected diseases” is inadequate because the developing 66 country populations who bear the primary burden of such diseases lack the means to incentivize such 67 investment (6). Even when innovation does advance equity, it may not do so for both current and 68 future generations—rather, these goals may conflict (7). For example, current investment in low-69 carbon energy does not fully reflect the interests of future generations who will be impacted by 70 
climate change (8). These unborn populations cannot influence current innovation systems. 71 
Making technologies work for sustainable development will require greater clarity in conceptualizing 72 the innovation process itself, identifying barriers to innovation, and learning from a wealth of 73 academic research and past experience. Innovation scholars have proposed several conceptual 74 frameworks for understanding how technologies emerge, change, and are adopted (3, 4, 9, 10). Yet 75 these literatures are not explicitly connected to the specific problems facing actors promoting 76 sustainable development (e.g., scientists conducting early-stage research, donors selecting particular 77 technologies for funding, or governments promoting technology cooperation (11)). In this paper, we 78 link a wide range of scholarship to empirical cases and real-world implementation challenges to 79 highlight ways of promoting technological innovation for sustainable development. 80 
We present three insights: 1) innovation is a complex adaptive system with non-linearities and tipping 81 points; 2) the socio-technical nature of innovation enables deeper understanding of barriers to 82 innovation; and 3) the capacity of actors to promote innovation is restricted by institutions not 83 oriented towards sustainable development, but reform is possible. To illustrate these insights, we use a 84 common set of cases that concern physical artifacts and non-physical practices; technologies at 85 different levels of maturity; a range of geographic areas; and interventions to address various 86 sustainable development needs (this set of cases is presented in more detail in Table 1 and the 87 Supporting Information). 88 
1. Understanding Innovation as a Complex Adaptive System 89 
An “innovation system” is the connected set of actors and institutions that shape the process of 90 technological change. Understanding how innovation systems work requires analyzing the actors and 91 institutions that contribute to innovation in a geographic region (3), sector (4), or technological area 92 (9). Actors typically include individuals and organizations, public and private, operating at multiple 93 
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scales (e.g., central governments, local authorities, universities, private firms, non-profits, and 94 technology users). Institutions include the set of formal and informal rules, norms, decision-making 95 procedures, beliefs, incentives and expectations that guide the interactions and behavior of actors in 96 an innovation system (12–15). The connections of actors and institutions across the many stages of 97 the innovation process, which occur in multiple sectors and at different decision-making levels, make 98 innovation systems complex and adaptive. 99 
1.1. Innovation Systems Operate at Multiple Stages, Sectors, and Levels 100 
Innovation happens in multiple stages that are tightly linked, often overlap, and do not necessarily 101 occur in a specific order. By “innovation stage” we refer to the variety of activities that occur during 102 the innovation process to shape technological change. There are a number of different ways 103 innovation systems and activities can be conceptualized (4, 9, 16). For clarity of exposition, we group 104 different types of innovation activities into seven stages: invention (the process leading to the initial 105 discovery of a technology), selection (the choice of a technology for a given setting), early adoption 106 (the use of a selected technology in a specific context), production (the manufacturing of a 107 technology), adaptation (efforts by users or inventors to modify a technology to better serve the needs 108 of individual users), widespread use (the broad adoption of a technology in different communities of 109 users), and retirement (the replacement of a technology by a new, more effective technology). 110 
The types of activities that occur in different innovation stages often require distinct modes of 111 thinking, the engagement of diverse actors (3), and the mobilization of many physical and intangible 112 resources. Hence, the performance of this set of interconnected and non-linear innovation stages 113 requires the broader system to perform specific “functions” (9). Further, innovation stages often occur 114 simultaneously, involving multiple actors at different decision-making levels, from individuals to 115 multinational governance bodies. Actors and their activities are embedded in social systems, which 116 are governed by institutions that shape innovation processes (17). We return to this in Section 2, 117 where we explore the interlinked socio-technical dimensions of innovation systems, and in Section 3, 118 where we explore the reciprocal relationship between actors and institutions. 119 
The range of actors, decision-making levels, and resources relevant to a single technology is 120 illustrated by the case of artemisinin combination therapy (ACT) for malaria (Table 1). In the 1990s 121 and 2000s, R&D for new drugs to replace those whose efficacy had been eroded by resistance was 122 taking place in  in China (in government-supported labs) and Switzerland (at a private firm), leading 123 to the invention of ACTs. Following a proposal by a panel of US Institute of Medicine experts, the 124 technology was subsidized by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and 125 UNITAID to make these drugs more affordable in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 126 Simultaneously, governments at the World Health Assembly were negotiating international norms to 127 protect existing drugs from antimicrobial resistance. 128 
Due to the pervasiveness of linkages in the innovation system across stages, sectors, and decision-129 making levels, intervening in any one part of an innovation system can create negative and positive 130 externalities that act as “ripple effects” throughout the system. On the negative side, innovation can 131 cause unintended consequences, particularly as technologies gain more widespread use, such as 132 the impact of local incentives for biofuel development on global food prices (18). On the positive 133 side, innovation in one technology area can lead to “spillovers” that enable more rapid improvements 134 and new applications in other areas (19). In this sense, when new knowledge becomes broadly 135 accessible, it can act as global public good by laying the foundation for further innovation (20). For 136 example, global positioning system technology was developed for defense applications but has 137 
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opened up other applications, including improved approaches for targeting disaster relief. The socially 138 optimal level of investment in technological innovation requires consideration of positive and 139 negative externalities that can have ripple effects and create spillovers across multiple stages, sectors 140 and levels. 141 
1.2. Innovation is Non-Linear 142 
Innovation does not happen linearly nor is it a random process. Rather, activities in different 143 innovation stages can occur in various chronological sequences throughout a technology’s lifecycle. 144 A well-functioning innovation system has deep connections between and a degree of co-dependence 145 among innovation stages, making the innovation system non-linear (21). Technological change nearly 146 always involves various feedback loops across the stages of innovation, unfolding in a chronological 147 order that rarely traces out a linear development pathway. 148 
The existence of feedback loops connecting activities in different innovation stages implies that 149 overcoming barriers (or “blocking mechanisms” (22)) to innovation in any one stage often requires 150 looking beyond that particular stage. For example, ceramic pot filters (CPFs) offer a means for users 151 to treat available water sources in their homes and reduce the incidence of water-borne diseases. CPFs 152 have apparent benefits, as they can be manufactured with local materials and labor. However, CPFs 153 often lack rigorous quality control during the production process and many areas where CPFs may be 154 deployed do not have access to an adequate supply chain for replacement parts (Table 1). 155 Interventions to increase CPF adoption without addressing issues in the production stages are likely to 156 deliver limited benefits. 157 
Actors that fail to recognize the importance of feedback loops often select and promote unsuitable 158 technologies for adoption. This problem is more prevalent when outside actors are insufficiently 159 familiar with local settings and are passionate about specific technologies (23). Where decision-160 making over technology selection is split among actors, a so-called “principal-agent problem” can 161 arise. For example, if non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies do not adequately 162 engage local communities, they may select inappropriate water treatment technologies on behalf of 163 the intended users, hindering adoption. 164 
Development of technologies in protected “niche spaces” can allow for important experimentation 165 and early-stage user interaction to build in necessary feedback (24, 25). For example, engaging users 166 when designing clean biomass cookstoves for Darfur has resulted in fourteen iterations of the stove, 167 leading to more suitable designs for local cooking practices (26). To design interventions in 168 innovation systems that build in feedback, actors must process large amounts of information 169 concerning technologies that can address particular needs, possible policy interventions, types of 170 financing arrangements, and input from local users. 171 
1.3. Innovation Systems have Tipping Points 172 
Like other complex adaptive systems, innovation systems can demonstrate punctuated equilibria 173 whereby thresholds create irregular bursts of explosive technological change*. These “tipping points” 174 in innovation systems are exemplified by past inventions, such as the steam engine, high-yield staple 175 crops, antibiotics, the printing press, and the internet. Each example featured rapid utilization of a new 176 invention, rich follow-on innovation, and broad societal change. Tipping points create dynamics in 177                                                      
* Mass species extinctions, the possibility of rapid sea level rise after a certain level of climate warming, sudden outbreaks of infectious disease, and rapid economic collapse of the global financial system are examples of observed and predicted tipping points of complex adaptive systems (27). 
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innovation systems that are characterized by “thresholds” that create time lags and other forms of 178 irregular technological evolution. 179 
In some cases, innovation systems can become path-dependent or “locked-in,” whereby relatively 180 small differences in prior stages of innovation lead to large and persistent differences in which 181 technologies achieve widespread use. Lock-in occurs through reciprocal feedback loops, such as 182 increasing returns to an initially adopted technology through continuous adaptation and refinement 183 (28). Lock-in can also occur when powerful actors, who may have the most to lose from changes to 184 the status quo, bias the institutions governing innovation systems to meet their preferences and 185 reinforce their positions of power. Lock-in poses a challenge often faced by new technologies in 186 capital-intensive and infrastructure-dependent sectors. One example is the challenge of replacing 187 fossil fuels with renewable energy, in which economies of scale, powerful incumbent firms, a long 188 history of incremental process technology improvement, and the long life of physical and institutional 189 supporting infrastructure give economic and political advantages to incumbent technologies (29). The 190 possibility of lock-in suggests that innovation systems may reach temporarily stable equilibria of 191 relatively static “technological regimes” (30). Lock-in builds longer time lags into the innovation 192 system, resisting change until tipping points reorient the system and technological regimes change 193 (30). 194 
Meeting this challenge includes designing interventions that intentionally cross some technological 195 tipping points (e.g. escaping from “poverty traps”), managing tipping points that have already 196 “tipped” (e.g. increasing access to the technological outcomes of the Green Revolution), and raising 197 barriers to avoid other tipping points altogether (e.g. catastrophic climate change). 198 
2. Understanding the Socio-Technical Nature of Innovation Systems 199 
Understanding innovation systems requires the integration of social and technical considerations. In 200 innovation systems, society and technology are inextricably linked–actors shaped by institutions in 201 society produce knowledge just as knowledge modifies and legitimizes the institutions of society. 202 This reciprocal process is referred to as “co-production.” (31–33). Co-production sheds light on the 203 ways that technologies and innovation systems reflect broader social, political, and moral 204 commitments of the societies in which they are embedded. Co-production also helps explain why 205 diverse societies privilege different outcomes or forms of scientific evidence relating to technological 206 risks and benefits over others. For example, South Korea and the United States have taken profoundly 207 approaches to the regulation and use of nuclear energy. In the US, the perceived risk of catastrophic 208 damage from a potential meltdown and the challenges of long-term waste disposal proved to be 209 insurmountable challenges to the proponents of nuclear energy. In contrast, South Korean decision 210 makers saw nuclear energy as a potential solution to what was viewed as an even bigger risk, namely 211 failing to catch up with the living standards of the developed world. While decision makers in both 212 countries believed that nuclear energy, in principle, could meet common goals related to energy 213 security and economic development, the distinct socio-technical systems led to different long-term 214 innovation pathways (33, 34). 215 
To understand the full range of factors influencing technological change, actors intervening in 216 innovation systems must grapple with the inextricable linkage of technology and society. As 217 illustrated in the literature on socio-technical systems (9, 17, 30, 33), technological systems can be 218 understood in terms of their “socio-technical characteristics” (STCs), which serve as an analytic tool 219 to structure comparisons across the many dimensions of innovation systems. Innovation systems can 220 
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be viewed through the lens of STCs to help diagnose barriers to innovation, increase the likelihood of 221 the ex-ante identification of problems, and support learning from previous experiences. 222 
2.1. Socio-technical Characteristics Diagnose Barriers to Innovation 223 
STCs are a useful analytical tool for understanding and diagnosing possible barriers to innovation that 224 may emerge when attempting to advance sustainable development in particular innovation systems. A 225 focus on developing insights inductively through cases spanning multiple sectors with common STCs, 226 rather than drawing strictly from one sector, location, or for certain actor groups, has great potential 227 for developing useful generalizations. 228 
The STC perspective can be used analytically to develop hypotheses about general conditions under 229 which innovation systems are likely to work rather than result in barriers. The usefulness of STCs 230 emerges from the ability of scholars and practitioners to incorporate new observations from a variety 231 of different contexts into their knowledge base and leverage those insights to make thoughtful 232 comparisons about potential pathways or barriers for other technologies with similar STCs. 233 
We illustrate the STC perspective with three STCs and their associations with specific barriers to 234 innovation that emerge from a broad range of literatures and cases: the presence of positive network 235 externalities, perceptions of mundaneness, and modularity. These three STCs exemplify a broad range 236 of potentially useful diagnostic STCs and are thoroughly supported by evidence in the literature. 237 Because STCs are a guiding concept for inductive investigation, no comprehensive list of relevant 238 STCs exists†. These three demonstrative STCs are certainly not the only ones that have analytic value 239 or even the most important ones; rather, they highlight the utility of an STC-focused approach to 240 diagnosing barriers to innovation. 241 
2.1.1. STC: Presence of Positive Network Externalities 242 
“The presence of positive network externalities” is an STC that describes the degree to which the 243 adoption of a particular technology by some increases the benefits from using the technology for 244 others (36). Users of technologies with network externalities benefit more from their use of the 245 technology as the total number of users increases. This is exemplified by the case of industrial 246 symbiosis, a practice to configure industrial technologies in a manner that reduces the overall impact 247 of manufacturing by linking wastes and byproducts in one process to the input needs of another (37). 248 The EcoTEDA industrial symbiosis program in Tianjin, China is a model where increasing the 249 number of users has greatly expanded the value of the network by enlarging the number and 250 robustness of possible resource exchanges between participating firms (Table 1). The role of network 251 externalities in accelerating technology adoption suggests the importance of strategic information 252 transmission and marketing to complement peer-to-peer information sharing. 253 
Network externalities also suggest that technologies may be locked-in when network effects are 254 strong and social learning is an important factor in adoption and effective utilization (28). However, 255 developing self-sustaining networks of peers that reinforce social learning de novo is difficult. This 256 dynamic is a major challenge for EcoTEDA, which has struggled to retain enough users to keep their 257 industrial symbiosis program viable. Barriers to adoption arise unless powerful actors are able to spur 258 the formation of self-sustaining networks. The presence of network externalities also suggests that 259 barriers to the timely retirement of technologies are high, as users find switching to other technologies 260 without established networks less attractive. 261 
                                                     † A more extensive list of STCs is proposed in Anadon, et al., 2014 (35). 
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2.1.2. STC: Perceptions of Mundaneness 262 
“Perceptions of the mundaneness of a technology” is an STC that describes the degree to which a 263 technology fails to hold the attention of key actors in an innovation system, especially actors who play 264 important roles in technology invention and selection. Perceptions of mundaneness tend to shift the 265 mobilization of resources away from these options, guiding priorities towards other less appropriate or 266 effective options (38). Technologies that draw on simpler scientific principles or approaches tend to 267 be perceived as mundane. However, mundaneness is fundamentally determined by social perceptions, 268 including whether a technology is considered novel or fits into pre-existing conceptions of a valuable 269 technology. 270 
The role of mundaneness is exemplified by the development of the system of rice intensification 271 (SRI) in Madagascar. In the case of SRI, established research centers working on high-yield drought-272 tolerant seed varieties were initially skeptical of the benefits of the SRI technology, which they 273 perceived to be a mundane, practice-based approach for improving rice yields. Instead, they preferred 274 modern laboratory techniques for developing new hybrid and genetically-modified crops. This bias 275 against mundane technologies led the established research community to ignore a potentially useful 276 technology for helping small farmers (Table 1). The mundaneness STC cautions practitioners to be 277 self-aware of institutional influences and social expectations that create perceptions unduly restricting 278 the solution set of technologies they consider. 279 
2.1.3. STC: Level of Modularity 280 
“The level of modularity” is an STC that describes the degree to which a technology is comprised of 281 design elements that are easily disaggregated and organized according to a formal architecture or plan 282 (39). Modularity may be a direct consequence of technological design, but it may also be more 283 directly socially constructed (e.g. in modular software design). A modular technology can therefore 284 change via innovation in a subset of its components that are later reintegrated into the whole without 285 complete redesign of the technology’s architecture. More modular technologies have lower barriers to 286 adaptation because the separability of components allows actors to improve one component without 287 the architectural knowledge of the entire technology (40). This expands the range of actors who can 288 engage in adapting a technology. Because adaptation costs are lower with increasing modularity, 289 skilled entrepreneurial actors may be able to expand the settings in which a modular technology is 290 suitable, thus serving a wider array of human needs. 291 
The relationship between modularity and the expansion of suitable contexts for a technology through 292 adaption is exemplified by the case of cookstoves (Table 1). After some success in supporting the 293 adoption of the Berkeley Darfur Cookstove (BDS) in Darfur, Sudan, the Berkeley cookstove team 294 sought to expand deployment of cookstoves to Ethiopia. The adaptation to accommodate different 295 cooking practices was facilitated by the modularity of the technology: while a common shell was 296 mass produced in India, the bulk of local adaptation was possible through the use of different pot 297 supports. 298 
2.2. Socio-Technical Characteristics Facilitate Learning across Innovation Systems 299 
Practitioners with a stake in advancing sustainable development usually have direct access to only a 300 limited set of experiences from which to develop evidence-based policy and action strategies. Too 301 often, practitioners struggle to make innovation work for a particular need because they fail to benefit 302 from the experience of others. This failure stems from a lack of interactions with actors working in 303 
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other fields and settings, together with siloes of narrowed expertise (41). This is a lost opportunity that 304 the identification of STCs can help address. 305 
STCs can serve to identify barriers to innovation ex-ante and to facilitate learning. For example, the 306 mundaneness STC can explain the degree of attention paid by actors to a technology in several of the 307 cases in Table 1. In contrast to the case of SRI discussed above, in the case of ceramic filters, funders 308 sometimes promoted the CPF technology because they were attracted by the idea of having local 309 potters build low-cost water filters with local materials; in other words, the technology was not 310 perceived as mundane because it was connected to an appealing story. However, this attention to 311 ceramic filters at times caused other water treatment technologies to be overlooked, such as those that 312 were already sold in the market and known by local actors. 313 
An example of potential learning across sectors from an STC perspective is the experience from 314 efforts to make the price of artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) for malaria treatment 315 affordable for rural populations in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. A group of global health 316 funding organizations created a global subsidy called the Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria 317 (AFMm) which reduced the price of ACTs to end-users. Manufacturers received the global subsidy 318 directly and then shipped reduced-price drugs to countries. They were then supplied into informal 319 village-level supply chains at a cost competitive with less desirable treatment options (Table 1). Here 320 we highlight a different set of STCs that are important in this case: end-users who have limited 321 financing and information, high prices of the technology relative to inferior alternatives, and lengthy 322 transnational supply chains between manufacturers and end-users. The case of ACT shares similar 323 STCs to efforts to make drought-tolerant seed varieties. Both ACT and drought-tolerant seeds are 324 meant to be used by small-scale end-users, have high relative prices, and involve lengthy transnational 325 supply chains. These shared STCs suggest that a similar intervention to provide a global subsidy 326 could be considered to address the need for more affordable drought-tolerant seed varieties for 327 farmers in developing countries. 328 
We conclude that the community of scholars and practitioners seeking to make innovation work for 329 sustainable development would be well served by an effort to build up a larger set of STCs along with 330 insights derived from their application. 331 
3.  Understanding Institutional Change in Innovation Systems 332 
Institutions shape the functioning of innovation systems by guiding and constraining the activities of 333 actors at multiple levels, ranging from customs that extend no further than a particular village, to 334 regional or national laws, to codified norms in international treaties (11). These institutions are often 335 not aligned to meet sustainable development goals. Fortunately, institutions can be changed by actors 336 who thus have the ability to reorient innovation systems towards sustainable development. 337 
3.1. Institutions are Not Necessarily Aligned towards Sustainable Development 338 
The complex web of existing institutions governing innovation systems reflects existing power 339 structures. Often, such institutions are not aligned with sustainable development due primarily to three 340 factors. First, existing institutions tend to drive innovative activity toward the areas of greatest 341 financial prospect, not the greatest human needs. Economic incentives propel much innovation to 342 meet the needs of those who can exert “market” or “demand pull” (42), but not those with few 343 financial resources. The problems of neglected diseases and neglected crops, for which few new 344 technologies have been developed, exemplify such gaps. 345 
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Second, existing institutions do not adequately govern activities producing negative externalities 346 mediated over environmental systems or over long time-horizons. For example, private actors can 347 often degrade the ecosystems on which human wellbeing depends without consequence. In the case of 348 industrial symbiosis, private incentives were insufficient to drive firms to participate in an industrial 349 symbiosis network that would have lowered overall environmental impacts in Tianjin in the short 350 term; additional financial and regulatory incentives to reduce waste and emissions were required 351 (Table 1). 352 
Third, the public-good nature of knowledge, in general and of technology in particular (see Section 353 1.1), raises questions about the possibility for institutions to restrict the dissemination of knowledge or 354 otherwise affect technological innovation for sustainable development. The intellectual property (IP) 355 regime is an institution that aims to incentivize innovation by allowing inventors to exclude others 356 from using patented technology for a fixed period of time, during which they can charge monopoly 357 prices for patented products or earn revenues from licensing. While the IP regime strengthens 358 incentives to invest resources in invention, it also restricts the use of new knowledge by raising prices 359 or blocking follow-on innovation (43, 44). It has been argued that the increasingly globalized IP 360 regime will diminish prospects for technology transfer and competition in developing countries, 361 particularly for several important technology areas related to meeting sustainable development needs 362 (45). 363 
These three shortcomings of innovation systems highlight the need for institutional reform. At a 364 national level, policy makers regularly reshape institutions to meet national interests, such as 365 increasing domestic economic growth, improving national security, or enhancing their citizens’ 366 wellbeing. National actors may develop public policies to promote innovation to advance these 367 interests, such as subsidizing R&D or creating publicly-funded research labs. However, many 368 sustainable development challenges and their potential solutions have important transnational 369 dimensions. The control of carbon emissions, the spread of infectious diseases, and the depletion of 370 shared water resources are examples in which both problems and solutions involve multiple nation-371 states. Yet, transnational institutions to drive technological innovation to address these problems 372 remain relatively weak or absent altogether, and national policies offer only patchwork solutions. To 373 meet key sustainable development challenges, greater alignment of institutions with sustainable 374 development goals is needed at all decision making levels. 375 
3.2. Innovation Systems Involve Many Actors Operating at Different Stages and Levels  376 
Reforming institutions to better align innovation systems with sustainable development requires 377 mobilizing collective action across a complex and large set of actors, who work at many levels and 378 who engage in activities that overlap and sometimes conflict (46, 47). As highlighted in Section 1, 379 innovation system complexity arises because actors in the innovation system operate across different 380 innovation stages and decision-making levels through interconnected activities. The 381 interdependencies of actors may be explicit, such as through technology commercialization licensing 382 agreements that involve a formal contract transferring intellectual property (48). Alternatively, 383 linkages connecting actors may be implicit, such as the underemphasized dependence of new product 384 development by many computer hardware and pharmaceutical firms on prior government-funded 385 R&D (49, 50). Collective action problems arise because actors operating across different stages and 386 decision-making levels vary in their interests and incentives, which are not necessarily driven by the 387 goal of sustainable development. In some cases, actors are strongly driven by market forces. In other 388 cases, a centralized authority, such as a single state or private firm, creates rules that govern the 389 behavior of actors across all (or many) stages and decision-making levels of the innovation system. 390 
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For example, a national government usually has little motivation to take into account the needs of 391 citizens beyond its borders, a profit-maximizing firm has insufficient incentive to invent technologies 392 for people who cannot afford its products, and consumers lack the impetus to consider how their 393 decisions impact other communities distant in time or space. 394 
Aligning actors working at different decision-making levels of the innovation system is challenging. 395 The problem is particularly relevant when needs that vary at the local level are not fully incorporated 396 into decision-making elsewhere. In efforts over the past few decades to promote the development and 397 adoption of cleaner and more efficient cookstoves, inventors and selectors of technologies were often 398 not fully engaged in local contexts and lacked an adequate understanding of the needs of end-users. 399 Many stove designs promoted by transnational actors proved unsuitable for the preparation of local 400 dishes, which led to significant barriers in achieving widespread adoption and achieving impact 401 (Table 1) (51). 402 
3.3. Actors Can Change Institutions to Re-orient Innovation Systems towards Sustainable 403 Development 404 
The cases discussed throughout this paper illustrate how the preexisting rules and norms that shape 405 innovation systems are not necessarily aligned towards sustainable development. However, while 406 institutions constrain actor behavior in the short term, institutions are not immutable. The incentives, 407 capabilities, and needs of actors that comprise innovation systems co-evolve with governing 408 institutions (4, 52, 53). So although the capacity and power of actors depend on institutions, 409 institutions themselves are shaped by actors and can change in both incremental and radical ways 410 (13). For example, in the early 2000s, efforts to expand access to treatment for HIV/AIDS were 411 hindered by stringent international IP rules that blocked developing countries from using lower-cost 412 generic versions of HIV drugs. A global network of civil society, developing country governments, 413 and health experts challenged the moral acceptability of these IP rules and succeeded in changing 414 norms to allow for much greater flexibility in how patents on medicines were managed in resource-415 poor settings (54). 416 
Institutions are inherently “sticky.” Changing innovation systems is a daunting task that requires 417 leveraging multiple types of power, such as normative power to challenge the ethical acceptability of 418 existing institutions; convening power to bring actors together to establish new goals, priorities, and 419 agendas; legal power to negotiate and revise norms, binding rules, and standards; informational power 420 to identify alternatives and to assess their feasibility; and financial power to create incentives, 421 implement costly new policies, and reduce the risk or cost of doing so (35). 422 
Here, we provide three additional examples drawn from Table 1, of how actors have induced 423 institutional change to promote sustainable development. In the case of drip irrigation, government 424 officials in Andhra Pradesh (AP), India designed a subsidy that reduced costs and incentivized private 425 companies to market and disseminate knowledge of drip irrigation, a technology that could improve 426 yields but was too expensive for most farmers in AP. Utilizing its legal power to change the rules 427 shaping the behavior of private firms and its financial power via a subsidy to implement the new 428 rules, the government reshaped institutions to spur widespread use of drip irrigation. In contrast, in the 429 case of SRI, a loose network of activists, lacking both legal and financial power, relied upon 430 informational and convening power to build a coalition of support for SRI. Finally, in the case of 431 ACT, NGOs and academics exercised normative power through a public advocacy campaign to 432 challenge the then-prevailing norm that donors should not subsidize relatively expensive medicines 433 for lower-income populations. 434 
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In sum, sustainable development is not yet a strong enough organizing principle to align actor 435 behavior in most innovation systems to systematically take into account the interests of low-income 436 populations and future generations. Realigning innovation systems towards sustainable development 437 requires changing institutions at all stages of the innovation process, from invention through 438 widespread use and retirement, and at multiple decision-making levels, from local to global. While 439 such changes may be difficult, committed actors who strategically mobilize the multiple types of 440 power available to them have achieved significant reforms. 441 
4. Conclusion 442 
Technological innovation has played a central role in achieving important societal objectives, such as 443 economic growth and improved human well-being. But innovation systems, driven primarily by 444 markets and the most highly-resourced states, are characterized by pervasive power imbalances. As a 445 result, the needs of marginalized populations and future generations are not met as well as they could 446 be. Re-orienting innovation systems towards sustainable development will require addressing power 447 imbalances and transforming many of the deeply embedded institutions that limit innovation systems 448 from delivering on their potential. We offer three recommendations for action derived from the 449 insights on innovation presented here, deepening and extending recommendations regarding 450 knowledge systems more generally (55). 451 
First, measures are needed to regularize learning across spheres of practice to improve understanding 452 of how to re-orient innovation systems towards sustainable development. Understanding innovation 453 systems and their socio-technical nature is a necessary precondition for the development of carefully 454 targeted interventions that realize the full potential of innovation for sustainable development. Many 455 potential lessons are available (41), but drawing appropriate conclusions requires analytical rigor, 456 which can be facilitated by the use of STCs. Actors with convening power should facilitate learning 457 across disparate communities of practice, for example, by organizing conferences that purposefully 458 bring together practitioners, policymakers, and scholars working in more than one sector. Research 459 funders should support comparative analyses that draw from the experience of more than one sector 460 or location. Universities should teach students across disciplines to think broadly about technological 461 innovation, and not only innovation in a single sector, region, or technology area. More broadly, 462 actors can use STCs as heuristics to identify possible barriers to innovation that could emerge when 463 selecting particular technologies or interventions. 464 
Second, power disparities can be mitigated by identifying ways to systematically take into account the 465 interests of underserved populations throughout the innovation process. Since impoverished and 466 future populations often lack the power needed to influence innovation systems, problems arise such 467 as when third parties select technologies poorly suited for end-users. There is also untapped potential 468 for end-users to adapt technologies for use in new settings (25). Building in channels of 469 communication between underserved populations and powerful actors would help alleviate power 470 disparities and strengthen the feedback loops that characterize well-functioning innovation systems. 471 We propose that actors with convening power and normative authority identify ways to more 472 meaningfully engage marginalized populations in innovation systems (56). For example, international 473 NGOs and United Nations agencies can directly engage marginalized populations when negotiating 474 norms and establishing priorities, rather than speaking on behalf of directly-affected populations. We 475 also argue for capacity-building among less-powerful populations to represent their interests in global 476 forums. The gradual shift in the multilateral climate regime to policies that more deeply engage 477 developing country governments and firms in how to innovative for climate change demonstrates that 478 such change is possible. Previously, international organizations primarily focused on technology 479 
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transfer, often through financing arrangements to export technology from more advanced countries to 480 developing countries. However, newer forms of cooperation seek to more deeply engage developing 481 country actors in the process of technology invention and selection by reducing information 482 asymmetries, decreasing social distance between actors with expertise and skills, and fostering new 483 collaborative R&D arrangements (57). 484 
Finally, we argue that actors should reform institutions to re-orient innovation systems towards 485 sustainable development, leveraging various forms of power to do so. Due to the complex-adaptive 486 nature of innovation systems, such reforms will be more effective if all stages of innovation and all 487 relevant decision-making levels are considered at the outset. To illustrate: reform efforts in the 488 biomedical innovation system previously focused on just one stage, such as driving invention for 489 neglected diseases, adapting vaccines to be heat-stable, or decreasing the price of HIV/AIDS 490 medicines. More recently, institutional reforms under consideration involve using publicly-financed 491 “push” and “pull” incentives that simultaneously steer invention towards socially negotiated goals and 492 facilitate widespread adoption by building affordability measures into R&D processes from their 493 inception. Governments of both industrialized and developing countries are being asked to contribute 494 to a global biomedical R&D fund for this purpose (58), an illustration of reforming institutions 495 simultaneously at both national and global levels. 496 
In the context of climate change mitigation, institutional reform to create a carbon price through 497 regional, national, and sub-national carbon markets has shifted the incentives facing consumers and 498 producers towards low-carbon forms of energy at all stages of innovation. For example, carbon 499 pricing increases the profitability of private action to invest in renewable energy invention, select 500 more energy-efficient appliances, and hasten the retirement of greenhouse gas-intensive power plants. 501 Yet carbon pricing alone may be inadequate for addressing climate change in a cost-effective manner. 502 Doing so also requires further strengthening incentives for private energy R&D and concerted public 503 R&D investment (59). 504 
Many types of interventions are needed to realign innovation systems for sustainable development, 505 requiring actors to leverage the types of power available to them. Altering the institutions governing 506 innovation systems may appear politically or practically impossible in the short-run. Yet without 507 institutional change, certain populations will remain excluded from the benefits of innovation, and the 508 interests of present generations will continue to unfairly outweigh those of the future. Making 509 technological innovation work for sustainable development requires making fundamental changes to 510 the rules of the game. 511 
  512 
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Figure Legends 753 
Figure 1. Summaries of six case studies of technologies and innovation systems to promote 754 sustainable development. The cases are detailed further in the Supporting Information.  755 
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